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Introduction 
 
In the prestigious Nihon shisō taikei collection, 
Hagakure may seem an oddity among works of 
deep philosophical or literary significance.1  Au-
thored in the early eighteenth century by a disgrun-
tled retired samurai of a small domain of remote 
Kyūshū, composed of heteroclite aphorisms and 
rants, inspired in peaceful times by a fanatic nostal-
gia for blood and battle, rescued from oblivion in 
the early twentieth century to be used as propaganda 
material for a cause toward which its author did not 
show the slightest interest, it seems to be there only 
by virtue of some accident.2 In this article I shall 
                                                  
1 Its companion in vol. 26 of the collection, the 
Mikawa monogatari, although no philosophical or 
literary masterpiece, can at least claim great his-
torical value. In the following footnotes all the re-
ferences to Hagakure are to this Nihon shisōtaikei 
26, Mikawa monogatari, Hagakure (Tokyo: Iwa-
nami Shoten, 1974) edition. The page number is 
followed by the number of the part or book and by 
the number of the specific saying or anecdote in this 
part. 
2 A certain Tashiro Tsuramoto (1678-1748) is 
said to have written down the words of the putative 
author, Yamamoto Tsunetomo (1659-1719). A 
number of works have addressed the difficult 
problems of the authorship of the work. See 
especially Fujino Tamotsu, ed. Zoku Saga han no 
sōgōkenkyū (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1987) 
89-113, and Sagara Tōru, Bushi no shisō (Tokyo: 
Perikan sha) 1984, and “Hagakure no sekai”, 
Mikawa monogatari, Hagakure (Tokyo: Iwanami 
Shoten. Nihon shisōtaikei, 1974) 657-61. Tokyo. I 
cannot delve here in this debate and the exact role of 
Tsuramoto in the composition of the book (there is 
no extant manuscript in Tsuramoto’s hand, only a 
number of copies with many variations). Sagara 
concludes that even if there are reasons to believe 
that Tsuramoto directly wrote large parts of 
Hagakure himself, it is safe to see it as reflecting 
Tsunetomo’s thought. 
justify this placement of Hagakure through an 
analysis of its diverse meanings. Without being ex-
haustive, I shall nevertheless try to grasp these 
meanings through three very different approaches 
most likely to uncover them – historical, sociologi-
cal and philosophical. 
In the standard approach of the history of ideas, 
concerned with the “what did it say?” question, I 
shall reconstruct the apparently incoherent argument 
of Hagakure around the unifying thread of the “pure 
will” (ichinen) – a will of no specific good, in fact a 
will of nothing or nothingness, that is, of death. It 
will be shown that “pure will” allows non-moral 
principles to coherently reposition notions otherwise 
contradictory or divided within themselves, like 
honor and loyalty. 
In the perspective of sociology of ideas, asking 
the “why did it say it?” question, I shall explain the 
social factors, as its author could apprehend them, 
that explain Hagakure’s focus on the will of death. 
Its author, convinced that the class of the samurai 
was on the verge of extinction, was imagining a 
desperate “identitary quest” organized around the 
flaunting of the core item of the cultural capital of 
the bushi – the act of death.  
In a philosophical analysis lastly, I shall argue 
that the richest insight of Hagakure is, echoing a 
trope found in other authors of the period, a proto-
existentialist pluralism in which there can exist sev-
eral very different forms of life, all of equal validity 
as long as they are sustained by a pure will. 
In various measure the insights I shall develop 
are indebted to the huge literature surrounding Ha-
gakure. After all, not many years pass in Japan 
without a book or two being published on Hagakure, 
and it is one of the Japanese works most often –
albeit partially – translated   into English. The 
largest part of this literature is of little academic 
significance, being intended for what is today the 
main audience of Hagakure: the bushidō aficiona-
                                                                             
Both Tsunetomo and Tsuramoto were samurai 
of the Saga domain, in northern Kyūshū, ruled by 
the Nabeshima family. Ironically, given Hagakure’s 
stress on loyalty, it was the site of what was 
arguably one of the most famous cases of usurpation 
of daimyō power in pre-modern Japan, when the 
ruling family of the Ryūzōji was displaced at the 
end of the sixteenth century by their vassals, the 
Nabeshima. 
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dos. Attracted by the “bushidō romance” or desiring 
to spread in today’s decadent world the moral values 
they believe to be extolled in the book, authors have 
let their enthusiasm and moral zeal take over analy-
sis of the complexity of the work.3 Detached and 
scholarly approaches of the book are far less nu-
merous. In fact a search through the well established 
journals on history of ideas, ethics, mentalities in 
Japan yields next to nothing on Hagakure. This is 
even truer of Western scholarship, which, in the 
words of Eiko Ikegami “tends to consider this fasci-
nating book little more than an extremist presenta-
tion of the samurai ethic that does not speak for the 
majority of “true” samurai and therefore refuses to 
investigate it further.”4  
In the standard approach of history of ideas that 
this article will firstly borrow, one would think that 
the main challenge for scholarly analyses would 
have been to organize the bewildering variety of 
themes found in Hagakure and to solve their nu-
merous, apparent or real, tensions. In fact many 
studies have preferred to deal with those themes 
separately. Furukawa Tetsushi, coming back to Ha-
gakure some decades after his classic Bushidō no 
shisō to sono shūhen, examined ten main topics of 
Hagakure in his Hagakure no sekai5. Mishima Yu-
kio had earlier, in 1967, presented forty-eight essen-
tial principles of the book in his Hagakure nyūmon, 
a perceptive commentary in which the topics of loy-
alty, honor and martial spirits play, overall, a very 
                                                  
3  Some of this literature is certainly worth 
studying, for scholars of considerable knowledge 
and analytical skills have succumbed to this mys-
tique. Inoue Tetsujirō (1855-1944) does so in his 
introductions to the anthologies of bushido literature 
(Bushidōsōsho, Tokyo: Hakubunkan 1905, and Bu-
shidōshū, Tokyo: Shun Yōdō 1934). Probably the 
best example mixing sound scholarly knowledge 
with a nostalgia for something that never was is pro-
vided by Furukawa Tetsushi, Bushidō no shisō to 
sono shūhen (Tokyo :Fukumura Shoten, 1957) 
which set the tone for later bushidō fans.  
4  Eiko, Ikegami, The Taming of the Samurai: 
Honorific Individualism and the Making of Modern 
Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 
279. 
5 Furukawa Tetsushi, Hagakure no sekai (Kyō-
to: Shimonkaku Shuppan, 1993).  
subdued role.6 Takano Shinji (1997), while examin-
ing the polarity between autonomy and the urge of 
self-destruction, also stressed the variety of mean-
ings and concepts of the work.7 When scholars did 
attempt to go beyond the diversity in search of some 
organizing principle(s), they often chose to disre-
gard whatever fit poorly with their solution. 8 Many 
of course have reduced the variety of ideas found in 
Hagakure to loyalty, honor, courage or even simply 
junshi, the ritual suicide upon the death of one’s 
master.9 Hurst (1990) offers a good English exam-
ple with his analysis of the three threads of “loyalty, 
honor, death.”10 Some have been more original. 
The prolific Kasaya Kazuhiko revisited the bushido 
discourse to stress the aspirations for moral auton-
omy.11 In recent years a great deal has been made 
by Ujie (1995) and Nakamoto (2006) of the remarks 
of Hagakure on the sexual dimension of the rela-
tionships between lord and vassal, an interesting 
and previously often ignored dimension to be sure, 
but probably not the most comprehensive perspec-
                                                  
6 Mishima Yukio, Hagakure nyūmon (Tokyo: 
Shinchō Bunko, 2009). Especially 29 seq. 
7  Takano Shinji, “Hagakure ni kansuru ik-
kōsatsu – sono shisō keisei no shokeiki wo megutte”, 
in Kyūshū bunkashi kenkyūjo kiyō, 40 (1997). 
8 I do not mean that contradictions do not exist 
and that a unifying thread or an organizing principle 
is always waiting to be discovered. But whenever 
we try to understand a text – like a conversation of 
everyday life – we need to start with the principle of 
charitable interpretation: with the assumption that it 
makes (one) sense. For a theoretical explanation of 
such need, see Donald Davidson on the principle of 
charity in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) 153. It is 
often the case that contradictions are more apparent 
than real, and that context and other remarks make 
sense of them. Only when we fail to produce a plau-
sible unified meaning should we resort to the con-
clusion of inconsistencies. 
9 Furukawa, Bushidō no shisō. 
10 Cameron Hurst, “Death, Honor, and Loyalty: 
The Bushido Ideal”, Philosophy East & West 40, No. 
4 (October 1990): 511-527.  
11 Kasaya,Kazuhiko, Bushidō to Nihongata nō-
ryokushugi (Tokyo: Shinchō sensho, 2007).  
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tive through which to approach the book.12 Much 
rarer have been the attempts to seriously reconstruct 
the variety of ideas and intuitions of the book 
around one or several organizing principles. The 
most remarkable is that of Sagara Tōru (1921-2000) 
who re-articulated Hagakure’s argument through the 
two concepts of bushidō and hook (service).13 Op-
posing for his part the concepts of bushi and hōk-
ōnin, Yoshiake Koike inherited, although in less 
systematic fashion, the approach of Sagara.14 My 
two categories of “loyalty of counsel” and “sym-
bolic service” partially overlap with Sagara’s analy-
sis. However, by not going beyond what I see as 
only a preliminary step in the ordering of the ideas 
of the Hagukure, Sagara is unable to produce a very 
coherent interpretation. In his reading, Hagakure 
remains irreconcilably torn between two unrelated 
ideals. The unresolved dichotomy also prevents him 
from effectively integrating many important fea-
tures: Buddhism, aesthetics, silent love, identity, etc., 
concerns that can be part of my interpretation. 
Given the difficulties of a hermeneutic of Haga-
kure, some scholars have preferred to treat it as a 
document of sociological interest, as a symptom of 
moral and social tensions more than a message. 
They have embarked on a sociology of ideas. 
Through its rich repertory of fights (kenka) Haga-
kure certainly could certainly be used to analyze 
private disputes, as did Taniguchi Shinko (2007).15 
In the limited scholarly literature in English the out-
standing example is that of Eiko Ikegami which 
treats primarily Hagakure as a document for an 
                                                  
12  Ujie Mikito, Bushidō to Erosu (Tokyo: 
Kōdansha gendai shinsho, 1995). Cf. his remarks on 
Hakagure, pp. 32-38. Nakamoto Masatoshi, Bushi-
dō kōsatsu (Kyoto: Jinbun Shoin, 2006). Umihara 
Shun, Bushidō – Nihon bunkaron (Kyoto: Nashino-
kiya, 2005) 44 stresses more the aesthetic dimen-
sion. 
13 Sagara Tōru, “Hagakure no sekai”, in Nihon 
shisō taikei 26, Mikawa monogatari, Hagakure ed. 
Sagara Tōru (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1974).  
14 Koike Yoshiaki, Hagakure: bushi to hōkō 
(Tokyo: Kōdansha, Gakujutsu Bunko, 1999). 
15  Taniguchi Shinko, Bushidōkō – kenka, 
adauchi, bureiuchi – (Tokyo: Kadogawa Gakugei 
Shuppan, 2007). See also her remarks on the proc-
ess through which Hagakure was lifted out oblivion, 
p. 9 seq. 
“ethno-mentality.” 16 I shall comment on her ap-
proach and interpretation in my analysis of the text. 
The third, philosophical, approach that I shall 
take up does not seem to have inspired much re-
search – the apparently widely held perception that 
Hagakure is the product of a semi-deranged mind 
probably discouraged much goodwill toward the 
work. When such a philosophically alert mind as 
Watsuji Tetsurō (1889-1960) discovered the book, 
he was certainly fascinated (he co edited an impor-
tant edition cum commentary of Hagakure with Fu-
rukawa Tetsushi), but he choose to read it as the 
times were suggesting, basing on this work his curi-
ous representation of the samurai’s loyalty to their 
master as unconditional and non-contractual.17 An-
other possible source of inspiration for a philoso-
phical analysis is the influence of Buddhism on Ha-
gakure, often ignored or dismissed in one sentence, 
but well stressed by an insightful amateur, Kamura 
Takashi18. In fact, although Hagakure was not writ-
ten by a philosophically literate scholar with great 
analytical skills, it abounds in sparks of philosophi-
cal interest. I hope to show that even though they 
are not so much the products of a deliberate analysis 
than the by-products of the encounter of the bushido 
discourse and of some Buddhist insights, these 
sparks, probably best explain the enduring fascina-
                                                  
16 Ikegami, Taming, 281. 
17 The edition is Hagakure, ed. Watsuji Tetsurō 
and Furukawa Tetsushi (Tokyo: Iwanami Bunko, 
1940). For Watsuji’s view of loyalty, see also 
Watsuji Tetsurō, Nihon rinri shisōshi vol. 2 (Tokyo: 
Iwanami Shoten. 1952) 482 sq. It is of course on 
such interpretation that the book was lifted out of its 
relative obscurity during the peak of the ultranation-
alist fervor in Japan – somewhat paradoxically since 
its author had no concept of a loyalty to the Em-
peror. Bunrui chūyaku “Hagakure no shinzui”, ed. 
Kurihara Kōya (Tokyo: Hagakure Seishin Fukyūkai, 
1930) and Kōchū Hagakure, ed. Kurihara Kōya 
(Tokyo: Naigai Shobō 1940) are other good exam-
ples of such exploitation of Hagakure.  
18 Kamura Takashi, Hagakure ronkō (Tokyo: 
Sōeisha-Sanseidō Shoten, 2001) especially 179-90. 
The Saga based journal Hagakure kenkyū, published 
usually quarterly since 1986 by the Hagakure 
Kenkyūkai, although not an academic journal offers 
sometimes interesting articles. 
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tion exerted by the book. 19 
 
The Message of Hagakure: An Inventory of 
Tensions 
 
Honor and loyalty.  What is Hagakure saying? 
The tensions running through the work certainly do 
not make for any easy answer. The most obvious of 
them is that between the notions of honor and loy-
alty (chū)/service (hōkō). Honor, sometimes referred 
to under the term na or reputation, but usually as the 
avoidance of shame, haji, appears as a purely indi-
vidual concern driven by an obsessively competitive 
urge. 20 It is acquired through the display of martial 
skills and valor – this is what Hagakure means by 
“bushidō” – and measured in a relentless competi-
tion with others.21  A samurai, claims the book, 
should never be said to be behind others.22 Indeed 
this is what he should fear above all.23 It is this 
competition that brings about the arrogant behavior 
so characteristic of Hagakure’s brand of bushidō. 
Commenting on the common observation that one 
has to be aware of one’s defects, modest and unas-
suming, Hagakure stresses that in the way of the 
samurai things are very different:  
The just middle is the supreme norm, but as 
far as martial concerns are involved, it won’t 
do if you are not someone who strives relent-
lessly to outdo (norikoshitaru) other people.24 
If one does not think, in a very arrogant way 
(kōman nite), that one is a brave samurai 
without peer in Japan, it will be difficult to 
                                                  
19 These Buddhist insights are quite different, I 
should stress immediately, from the usual bushidō-
zen marriage that we find in works like Takuan Sō-
hō’s Fudōchi shinmyōroku, much celebrated by 
bushido aficionados, that is focused on martial 
technique.  
20 For an instance of the use of na, see 557, 
XI.42. 
21 Miyamoto Musashi’sGorin no sho, where the 
term “bushidō” is nowhere to be found, puts it even 
more crudely: “the way in the strategy (heihō) of the 
bushi is to be superior to others.” 
22 226, I.19; 260, I.162. 
23 252, I.117. 
24 245, I.83, also 256, I.137. 
demonstrate this valor. It all depends on the 
intensity of the energy expressing martial 
valor.25 
But how are we to reconcile this egoistical quest 
for honor with the blind and selfless service also 
required from a good retainer? For good service is 
repeatedly claimed to entail the abandonment of all 
individuality and personality and the transformation 
of the retainer into a mere tool in one’s lord hands.26 
The good retainer serves his master  
as if he was dead (shinimi ni natte), […] leav-
ing to him all considerations of good and bad, 
giving up his own body.27 
The author of Hagakure then pictures himself as a 
simple doll (ningyō) or a ghost (yūrei) at the service 
of his master, like Ignacius of Loyola is supposed to 
have portrayed himself – perinde ac cadaver – at 
the service of his god.28 All other virtues and con-
siderations, and, first of all, the great rival of loyalty 
that was filial piety, disappear, as this blind obedi-
ence reigns over everything.29 Further indications 
of this radical erasure of the self are easy to spot. 
                                                  
25 235, I.47, also 282, II.33. 
26 It should be noted that chū in Hagakure is not 
so much the loyalty to a house – a common 
understanding in Tokugawa samurai society – than 
loyalty to an individual. There was, as I argue 
elsewhere (“Loyalty in samurai discourse”, Japa-
nese Studies 27, No 2 (2007): 139-154), no 
universally accepted understanding of chū. The 
requirements of service, as well as its objects, were 
all open to negotiations and interpretations of 
interested parties. Frequent ethical dilemma would 
typically give rise to different answers. Manuals of 
casuistic even existed for this sort of contingency. 
Good examples are Asami Keisai, Chūkō ruisetsu 
(Tokyo: Sanshodō Azusa, 1870) and Hayashi Razan, 
Jumon shimonroku, in Zoku Nihon jurinsōsho, vol. 
2, ed. Seki Giichirō (Tokyo : Hō Shuppan, 1971). 
See also the discussions of Kumazawa Banzan, 
ShūgiwaShoin Banzan Zenshū, vol. 1, ed. 
Masamune Atsuo (Tokyo : Banzan zenshū kankōkai, 
1940-42) 272-3. But authors had a considerable 
latitude to define chū, just like any other concept. 
27 221, I.7; 223, I.9. 
28 254, I.127 and 230, I.35. 
29 226, I.19; 229, I.31. 
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Service is so blind that it should be gratuitous, that 
is, never a function of favors received30. Hagakure 
claims and repeats that any expectation of reward, 
any favor indeed, destroys true service.31 Suggest-
ing that retainer service was in fact usually under-
stood as being conditional on reward or favor, Ha-
gakure even urges samurai to forget any conscience 
of “being loyal”, and only to serve selflessly with-
out the least expectation.32 Indeed serving a harsh, 
unreasonable and ungrateful master is a wonderful 
opportunity to prove true service.33 Lastly, the blind 
and unconditional or gratuitous service must be ab-
solute: since service is not conditional upon the 
quantity of favor received, it cannot know any limit. 
It is thus best expressed in the ultimate gift a re-
tainer may give to his lord – his life. All that Haga-
kure seems to be telling us is that good service de-
mands that the retainer’s life does not belong to him 
any longer, and that it should be sacrificed for the 
lord at just any moment. “One should give his life to 
                                                  
30  There would indeed be some conceptual 
contradiction, or at least tension, in the notion of a 
blind obedience that would depend on reward. The 
ideal of unconditional, or gratuitous, service was of 
course frequently encountered in the moral 
discourses of the period – and was later often 
singled out as one striking difference between the 
feudal relationships in Japan and in Europe. 
However in practice, cases where harshness, 
ingratitude and shabby treatment of the retainers by 
their master all but dissolved the obligations they 
felt to his person or family were even more common. 
After all, absent a favor to be returned could there 
be an intelligible reason for good and loyal service? 
The Mikawa monogatari, written by a poorly 
treated retainer of the Tokugawa, shows vividly 
through its repeated injunctions to resist the 
temptations of disloyalty that any perception that 
the lord was not observing his part of a tacit contract 
endangered the relationship. 
31 297, II.99; 300, II.110. 
32 573, XI.139. 
33 262, I. 175; 503, IX.24. However, because 
the idea of an obligation of loyalty would remain 
unintelligible if not for some favor received at some 
time, Hagakure repeatedly justifies the obligation of 
good service by one original favor – an appointment, 
a gift, a stipend, etc. (for example, 248, I.94; 289, 
II.62). 
his lord, and that is it.”34 
This contrast between a self-centered obsession 
to claim superiority over others and the selfless, 
blind, gratuitous and absolute service of the master 
is of course is well known to readers of Hagakure. 
We should resist the temptation to solve it through 
some convenient interpretation of honor and loyalty 
– saying, for example, that the competition lies in 
service to the lord, and that if there is arrogance it is 
that of blind service; there is, after all, no textual 
evidence for such an ad hoc reading. This contradic-
tion is only the start of a series of tensions. 
The Tension within Loyal Service.  Inside 
the idea of service itself lies thus a tension between 
the blind and absolute service to the lord and re-
peated mentions of the necessity of thoughtful and 
critical counsel. Hagakure stresses at times that the 
“great loyalty” is to offer critical advice to the lord 
for his sake or for that of the domain, and to correct 
his mistakes.35 Here, blind obedience and faithful 
entrusting of all considerations and reflection to the 
lord are nowhere to be seen; in their place, skillful 
counsel, planning, reflection, and ability to maintain 
harmonious relationships with other retainers are 
crucial.36 Wisdom, (chi), the generic concept cover-
ing these qualities, is acquired through experience 
and lengthy consultation with others.37 Arguably, 
                                                  
34 224, I.12. 
35 258, I.150. For the “great loyalty”, see 312-
13, II.140; 554, XI.28. 
36 217, I.15; 233, I.44; 571, XI. 129. 
37 275, II.7. The thoughtful form of service, 
however, abounds in fakes, says Hagakure. Many 
retainers, hoping to pass themselves off as loyal and 
courageous, publicly remonstrate with their lord, 
and make their advice known far and wide. Even 
when the counsel is sound, they risk antagonizing 
their master, forcing him to make humiliating retreat 
or to look like a fool. Their attitude is self-interested 
and does not belong to the category of good and 
loyal service (233, I.43). There is thus an art of giv-
ing advice, an art to which some of the most inter-
esting and thoughtful pages of Hagakure are de-
voted (256, I.136; 258-9, I.152-4). As its author re-
marks, advice is something that, despite their usual 
protestations to the contrary, people do not like to 
hear (see 224, I.14, and 233, I.43). The main point is 
to give advice or remonstrate in private and let the 
master take all the credit for sound decisions. 
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all this fits very poorly with blind loyalty and also 
with the obsessive self centered pursuit of fame. 38 
This is because the best service is discreet. It should 
be “service from the shadow” (kage no hōkō).39 
This obviously means that truly excellent retainers 
may remain unknown to outsiders (ibid.). And it 
also means that not only is fame forgotten, but that 
dishonor may be incurred: if, in spite of private 
counsel, their lord persist in evil ways, good retain-
ers should try to hide them, and if need be, shoulder 
the public blame and shame.40 
The Frenzy to Die and Other Considerations. 
Tensions continue in the state of mind that Haga-
kure calls shinigurui, the “frenzy to die”, a deeply 
irrational, self-destructive urge that ostensibly re-
jects all moral considerations, most notably those 
we have just seen. It is the attitude of the samurai 
who has given up reflection, calculations, planning, 
moral concerns and expectations (of victory espe-
cially) to throw himself furiously into a hopeless 
fight. While the term shinigurui makes its appear-
ance well into Hagakure, the idea is explicitly ex-
pressed at the outset in the famous second apho-
rism: “The way of the warrior (bushidō) is to be 
found in death. It consists, whenever there is a 
choice, of settling for death. That is all there is to it. 
One has decided and moves forward.”41 There Ha-
gakure mentions the madness, kichigai, involved in 
this pursuit of death, an expression that will appear 
repeatedly afterward.42 
                                                  
38 Here again there would not be the slightest 
textual evidence for another tempting ad hoc 
interpretation that would consider that it is in 
offering counsel that the retainer should be like a 
doll! Such is the problem with Maruyama Masao’s 
interpretation of Hagakure in his classic study, 
Chūsei to hangyaku (Tokyo: ChikumaShobō, 1992) 
cf. 19. Passages where the retainer is presented as 
standing up to his lord do not simply erase those 
where he is said just as clearly to have abandoned 
not only self interest but also all moral consi-
deration and reflection. A good proof is in the fact 
that the two types of loyalty are explicitly opposed 
in Hagakure (see below). 
39 574, XI.139 
40 306, II.129  
41 220, I.2. 
42 Some commentators and translators try to 
weaken the import of the term shinigurui, suggest-
At any rate, just go to the end, to the 
madness, throw your life away, and that is 
it.43 
When the expression shinigurui appears, the 
author is even more explicit: 
There is no need for loyalty or for filial piety; 
bushidō is about the frenzy to die.44 
As his choice of terms shows, the author 
wanted to stress the problematic dimension of this 
sort of behavior. Neither a suicide born out of de-
spair, nor some sort of risk taking for the sake of an 
end – attitudes that may be meaningful –, the frenzy 
to die, as an aimless enthusiastic embrace of death, 
is certainly very puzzling.  
Even when you stand no chance, attack. 
There is no need here for wisdom nor prow-
ess. The hero (kusemono) gives no thought to 
victory or defeat. Without a moment’s  hesi-
tation he is possessed by the frenzy to die.45 
It is tempting to link the frantic urge to die to the 
notion of honor. Honor after all was acquired 
through the display of courage, that is, the willing-
ness to unflinchingly confront death.46 Indeed, “The 
                                                                             
ing that this refers merely to a bold decision to die 
(cf. the note of the Nihon shisōtaikei edition, p. 251, 
which explains shinigurui as “susunde shiji ni 
totsunyū suru koto”); but the dimension of 
irrationality and insanity is too explicitly suggested 
by the concurrent term of kichigai (occurrences of 
which are quite frequent, as in p. 251, I-113; 303, 
I.118), and by Tsunetomo’s constant rejection of 
rationality and calculation to make such inter-
pretation plausible. True, the expression shinigurui 
is difficult to translate. It has been made semi-
popular by a semi-famous anime (Shigurui, 2007), 
but it has not entered everyday Japanese language. I 
take it as meaning a frenzy to die at the first oppor-
tunity, given the slightest motive, and regardless of 
the possible outcome. 
43 267, I.193. 
44 251-52, I.113. 
45 252 , I.55. 
46 The oldest signs – that we see in the Taiheiki 
for example, well before the appearance of the ex-
pression bushidō – of some awareness by warriors 
that theirs was a specific way, michi, refer to this 
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way not to be shamed is different (from victory or 
defeat); it merely consists in (fighting to) death.”47 
Further, of the single-minded pursuit of death, Ha-
gakure affirms that “It is madness, but there is no 
shame should one die without having achieved 
one’s goal.”48However, the constant rejection of any 
concern for outcome, for victory – “Victory and 
defeat are matters of the temporary forces of cir-
cumstances.”49 – lends to this form of honor a very 
distinctive tonality, obsessed simply with the urge 
to die before the others.50 This frantic death, totally 
unconcerned with the outcome, is what contempo-
raries called inujini, the dog’s death, the utterly vain 
and useless death, the death that serves no purpose 
and helps no one. This also is claimed explicitly in 
the opening statement:  
The idea that dying without achieving one’s 
goal is ‘to die a dog’s death’ comes from a 
sophisticated and delicate bushidō. But when-
ever we face the choice (of life and death), 
there is no need to try to achieve our goal. 
[…] It is madness, but there is no shame 
should one die without having achieved one’s 
goal.51 
The “dog’s death” simply becomes the end in it-
self, the object of a furious impulse to death which 
                                                                             
way as being characterized by the absence of the 
fear of death. In Hagakure indeed it is exceptional 
to see observance of moral virtues become the crite-
rion of honor. True the book seems to quote approv-
ingly Kusunoki Masashige, the famous Emperor 
loyalist:  “to surrender – whether as a trick or a 
ploy, or in the interest of the lord – is something a 
bushi simply does not do.” (259, I-158), because, 
presumably, such conduct would be unbefitting a 
samurai. These considerations however do not play 
any important role in the conception of honor in 
Hagakure which clearly inherits of an old tradition 
in samurai values which condones deception and 
lies as legitimate means in battle or quarrels (265, 
I.189; 555, XI.32). Its author would have been quite 
startled by the later, and deceptive, image of the 
noble and generous warrior. 
47 237, I.55; also pp. 220, 225, 237. 
48 220, I-2. 
49237, I.55. 
50260, I. 162. 
51 220, I.2. 
seems to defy all logic and reason.  Referring to 
words by Lord Naoshige, Hagakure says: “One 
should become insane (kichigai) and desperate to 
die (shinigurui).”52 Later its author claims that he 
resolved, having accepted this view, to go to the end 
of this madness.53 Of course in the common view 
“defeat” is awaiting, but, as he concludes, “The 
point is a quick and beautiful ‘defeat’.”54 
The Sexual Dimension, and Various Pleas-
ures. All this does not seen to sit terribly well with 
the desire to overcome others, to triumph in honor-
ific hubris, even less with thoughtful counsel, or 
selfless loyalty for the good of the master. However, 
as if the picture was not complex enough, another 
side of the retainer-master relationship enters, the 
sexual dimension of the servant/master relationship. 
One of the most notorious aspects of Hagakure to-
day is that it abounds in mentions of the widespread 
homosexual practices among samurai.55 It is clear, 
further, that those relationships are necessarily also 
hierarchical relationships between partners of dif-
ferent ages.56 It is in fact often the case that these 
are relationships between a master and his re-
tainer(s), strong enough to push the retainer to sui-
cide upon the death of his lover.57 Even here how-
ever some internal tension appears, for the emo-
tional attachment is also said to be best left secret 
                                                  
52 251, I.113. 
53 303, II.118. 
54 300, II.108. Once a fight is started, however 
ill fated it may be, Hagakure leaves no room for 
calculations and tactical retreat. The first setback is 
irremediable for it cannot be integrated in long term 
planning: it is important never to be in a position of 
inferiority, never to be on the losing side, even if 
you can expect to win in the end, because if the 
fight is stopped then, it is your loss (245, I-84). The 
paradox is that one should refuse to retreat even if 
this is the way to insure victory, thus making death 
certain! 
55 264, I-181; 569, XI.115. While it was not un-
usual to compare the relationship between a retainer 
and his lord to that of a husband and his wife (cf. 
Izawa Banryū, Bunshi kun, in Kinsei buke kyōiku 
shisō vol. 3 (Tokyo: Nihon toshosentâ, 1979) 152), 
this was made for the purpose of expressing a social, 
hierarchical relationship, not a sexual one. 
56 263-4, I-180. 
57 290, II.64; 467, VIII.25; 563, XI.83. 
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and silent: “True love is silent love” (shinobu koi), 
the sort of love that you deny even when asked by 
the object of the attachment.58 
Should the reader find those injunctions some-
what puzzling, what will s/he think of one last rec-
ommendation – since its author seems now to be 
saying that, after all, we should only do what we 
like, and that obviously we all have very different 
tastes? 
A man’s life is really short. It is best he does 
what he likes. It would be silly to spend one 
life in this dream-like world doing things one 
does not like, looking at sufferings. But be-
cause this (observation), when one takes it 
improperly, may lead to harm, it should not 
be told to the likes of young people and kept 
for one self. I like to sleep. And now, as is ap-
propriate to my condition, I intend to spend 
more and more time inside to sleep.59 
It is not necessary to stress how incoherent a 
picture all these traits form. Kamura rightly de-
scribed Hagakure as a “bundle of contradictions” – 
mujun no katamari.60 What principle could order 
and tie together in some coherent way injunctions to 
be modest yet arrogant, thoughtful yet brash and 
impulsive, calculating yet disregarding outcome, 
blind yet discerning, desperate to overcome others 
yet happy to be defeated in a beautiful way, in love 
but silent or only willing to die, selflessly devoted, 
yet doing only what one likes? If, following a com-
mon intuition, we interpret honor as being fulfilled 
in loyal service, how do we explain the frenzy to die, 
the urge toward a meaningless death, or the two 
opposed types of service?61 
                                                  
58 273, II.2; 289, II.62. On denial of love: 282, 
II.34. Even when no overt sexual dimension is 
present, the emotional bond, typically spurred by an 
insignificant favor of the lord, is repeatedly 
mentioned in Hagakure. 
59295, II.86. 
60 Kamura 2001, 289. 
61 The contradictions are such that it is very 
unlikely that taking into account of the situation 
when one has to be modest (in offering counsel) yet 
arrogant (in the quest for honor), thoughtful (of the 
good of the domain) yet brash and impulsive (in the 
constant competition of samurai life), calculating 
(the benefit expected for one lord) yet disregarding 
Reconciling the Tensions 
 
The Importance of Positions A first step to-
ward reducing the contradictions is to look at the 
various positions of the samurai to whom these in-
junctions are addressed. As they appear to be ad-
dressed to different people in different positions, 
they, in fact, may not be in competition. Ultimately 
we shall see that not only we can order these injunc-
tions as function of a hierarchy, but that we can also 
unify them more strongly as different but equally 
valid attitudes as long as they are willed by a pure 
will. 
Positions appear, with explicit mentions of their 
role in solving the contradictions, in Hagakure’s 
discussions of the different forms of service or loy-
alty. There is, on the one hand a blind obedience, 
where the retainer is a ghost, a corpse or a puppet 
following the lord, right or wrong, and is always 
eager to embrace death; on the other, thoughtful 
advice, remonstrance, and consideration of the good 
of the lord. Typically this tension has been glossed 
over, authors choosing to look only at one side of 
service. Kasaya, for example, having quoted some 
of the passages pointing to blind loyalty, stresses 
others in favor of the loyalty of counsel to argue that 
here resides the true conception of loyalty articu-
lated in Hagakure.62 Ikegami seems to be doing the 
same thing, and certainly does not explain the ar-
ticulation between the two forms of service.63 But it 
is simply impossible to subsume all forms of loyalty 
under the loyalty of counsel. Firstly, the corpse of 
blind obedience is said to have given up all judg-
ment. 64  Secondly, irrationality and disregard for 
outcome are too often extolled. Lastly there exists a 
very convincing explanation for the existence of, 
and even the need for, two very different types of 
service. Hagakure says quite explicitly that service 
to one’s master should be expressed in different 
forms across the complex scale where samurai were 
                                                                             
outcome (in the frenzy), blind (in following one’s 
lord’s good or bad intentions) yet discerning (in 
trying to steer him toward better ways), etc., would 
help solve these difficulties. People do not change 
psychological structure that easily. 
62 Kasaya 2007, 38. 
63 Ikegami 1995, 292. 
64 223, I.9 
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ranked. In the samurai’s military and bureaucratic 
organization attitudes and forms of service toward 
the lord, or toward each other, were minutely regu-
lated and differentiated in function by hierarchical 
distance. Thus, contrary to appearances, Hagakure 
is not contradicting itself when, having claimed that 
the good samurai, like a ghost or a puppet, has en-
trusted to his lord all considerations of good and 
evil, it also says that the good samurai should think 
and consider the best course for his master, and 
should offer counsel. There is no contradiction sim-
ply because these bushi were different persons. It 
was not the job of a low ranking samurai to offer 
advice, to be concerned by the good of the domain, 
to express opinions on this matter, etc. That was the 
exclusive responsibility of the closest aides of a 
daimyō, a fact that Hagakure stresses explicitly and 
repeatedly.65 The two different forms of service are 
thus closely determined by difference in standing 
and proximity to the lord. I shall call these two 
forms of service “loyalty of counsel” on the one 
side, and “symbolic” or “virtual service” on the 
other.  
The former notion is straightforward: the loy-
alty of counsel is basically the thoughtful loyalty 
mentioned above, owed by dignitaries and high 
placed confidants. It consists in sound but discreet 
and private advice, complemented by the willing-
ness to hide the lord’s defects if he does not make 
amends and even to publicly shoulder the blame. 
It is the latter type of service, owed by low 
ranking hōkōnin, which proves to be the most in-
triguing – for what sort of service could lower rank-
ing samurai offer in peaceful Tokugawa times? 
Without particular ability or talents they were con-
demned to silence. Notoriously underemployed, 
they were often reduced to the condition of rōnin, as 
so many anecdotes make clear. If they were lucky 
they would have a job – in the kitchen, the stable, or 
in some obscure office. All they could do there was 
to perform as conscientiously as they could what-
ever task they had been assigned.  
However, it is in the service of those disem-
powered retainers that many of the puzzling features 
we have observed above are at last reconciled. The 
blind obedience of the doll or the ghost, which has 
given up all considerations of right or wrong, is 
there allied firstly and most obviously to the in-
                                                  
65 233, I.43; 253, I.123; 313, II.140; 554, XI.28. 
tensely emotional attachment to the master. In fact 
only this emotional investment seems to be able to 
explain and justify the total absence of reward, and 
the unconditional and absolute character of the sub-
ordination. At the same time this very unbalance 
seems to demand that the emotional attachment is 
best kept silent. Often, at the death of the master, the 
souvenir of an insignificant favor, even comical in 
its insignificance, a favor unthinkingly given by the 
lord to a retainer whose existence he was barely 
aware of, becomes in the anecdotes of Hagakure the 
trigger of a resolution of junshi.66 Most importantly, 
I believe that to the symbolic service of the humble 
hōkōnin should also be attached the notions of 
honor and the frenzy to die, and their privileged 
expression, the private fights called kenka inspired 
by bravado, arrogance or revenge which occupy 
such a crucial place in Hagakure (the ninth book is 
largely a collection of kenka narratives). Why this is 
so may not be immediately obvious. Firstly, honor 
per se is an individualistic concern quite foreign to 
the master-retainer bond. Secondly, when respond-
ing to insults and frenetically engaging in kenka, 
low ranking samurai were exposing themselves to a 
swift condemnation to seppuku They were thus 
making themselves unavailable for service. How-
ever, on the first point we should remember that this 
honor was the honor of samurai – etymologically of 
“servants” – and that probably it could not be con-
ceived of outside the feudal relationship. On the 
second we need to realize that the seppuku of these 
over-numerous and underemployed individuals did 
not harm their lord – far from it. Their dispensabil-
ity insured there was little conflict with the concrete 
and humble tasks they could offer! Hagakure in fact 
never attaches much credit to the mundane work of 
lowly retainers. For its author the service owed by 
lower ranking samurai was only fulfilled or proven 
in the gift of their life, but since the times were 
peaceful, this service was, in most cases, purely 
virtual. Samurai were waiting to be useful; they 
were waiting for the unlikely “great crisis” (daiji no 
ba) so often mentioned and hoped for, waiting, so to 
speak, to be samurai. 67 Since this was not to be, 
humble hōkōnin, were reduced to jumping at the 
                                                  
66 460, VIII.7; 475-6, VIII.46. 
67 502, IX.21. 
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flimsiest opportunity to throw their life away.68 It is 
here that kenka, as parody of battle, enter symbolic 
service: the frenzy to die in private fights showed 
that the lord had very courageous retainers and he 
could take credit for this.69 Confirming the impor-
tance of the unthinking and honorific frenzy for 
humble retainers more than willing to engage in 
kenka, Hagakure constantly warns against the perils 
of learning (gakumon), reflexion (rikutsu, chie), 
penetration (mihesuguru), strategy (gunpō, heihō) 
and especially discrimination or discretion (bun-
betsu).70 All that is required is an impetuous and ill-
fated élan.71 “The way of the samurai is about 
dashing forward, without the slightest hesitation, 
even blindly.”72 Unsurprisingly Hagakure intones 
in many passages a curious ode to “excess.”73 It 
thus seems that what I called the symbolic service is 
entirely permeated by the violent, impetuous, some-
times sexual, honorific, unthinking, emotional, mar-
tial spirit of bushidō. Martial spirit is the only form 
that the symbolic service of the lower ranking samu-
rai may take, and any form of violence, including 
private violence, is easily linked to retainer’s service 
and homage to the lord.  
                                                  
68 527, X.67. There a low ranking samurai who 
claims to have been of no use so far jumps into the 
flames of a burning residence, recovers an important 
document, opens his belly and insert the document 
inside so that flames cannot damage it. 
69 510, X.1; 524, X.65. The link between bush-
idō and kenka is not unique to Hagakure. In the 
Kōyō gunkan (Tokyo: Jinbutsu Ōraisha, 1966) we 
see retainers oppose the kenka ryōseibai regulations, 
which made punishment of all parties involved in a 
kenka mandatory, under the argument than only sol-
diers rough and impetuous enough to engage in 
thoughtless kenka can make good samurai. 
70 243, I.72; 265-66, I.189; 269, I.199; 253, 
I.121, 122; 288, II.61; 531, X.84; 554, XI.26. The 
distinction between bushidō and bunbetsu, like that 
of bu and bun is classic of course; Hagakure is quite 
remarkable in opposing these notions, clearly 
viewed as antagonistic to what I call symbolic loy-
alty. Positive, but rarefied, mentions of bunbetsu 
should obviously be attached to the loyalty of coun-
sel (cf. 275, II.8). 
71 554, XI.26; 560, XI.60. 
72 265-66, I.189. 
73 245, I.83; 265, I.188; 268, I.195. 
We can thus divide the various contradictory in-
junctions of Hagakure into two different clusters 
ordered by different forms of service.74 Hagakure 
sometimes indeed explicitly oppose the loyalty of 
counsel to the symbolic service.75 And its choice of 
terms to characterize them is revealing. I have not, 
by and large, talked of “loyalty” to refer to the ser-
vice owed by lower ranking samurai, because Ha-
gakure typically does not talk of chū in such in-
stance. While chū is sometimes presented as a gen-
eral requirement of samurai, the term is normally 
reserved for the loyalty of counsel.76 On the other 
hand, “bushidō”, the “frenzy to die”, “courage” are 
expressions that appear normally to characterize the 
service of lower ranking samurai. Around those cen-
tral notions two small clusters of notions then ap-
pear: chū, advice (kangen), wisdom (chi) (prepara-
tion, planning, consultation, talent, etc.,) on the one 
hand; bushidō, bushi, courage, honor, silent love, 
frenzy on the other. (Hōkō is one term that may ap-
pear in characterizations of both type of service.) In 
Hagakure, those two clusters of notions usually ap-
pear in parallel manner without much contact, if 
any.77 
Honor and Loyalty. Having thus solved the ap-
parent contradictions between two different forms 
of service, we can also see why in Hagakure there is 
no lasting conflict between honor and loyalty either. 
Of course, the conflict was possible. As has been so 
well documented by Ikegami, the controls and dis-
cipline had to be imposed on proud samurai likely 
to bring trouble to their lord, posed the two notions 
of honor and loyalty in stark and irreconcilable ten-
sion. Indeed samurai treatises themselves frequently 
recognized that protection of the lord’s interests and 
protection of one’s reputation could conflict. Exhor-
tations to act one way or the other were even some-
times offered. In the Kōyō gunkan there is a clear 
advice not to engage in quarrels of no significance 
for one’s lord as this would prevent one from fulfill-
                                                  
74 One rare characteristic shared by the two 
types of loyalty would be the importance of eti-
quette, manners and careful preparation, as Koike 
(1999, pp.89-92) rightly stresses. 
75 220, I.3; 554, XI.28. 
76 230, I.35; 275, II.7 are instances where chū is 
used in a more general way. 
77 Cf. the contrast between 571, XI.125 and 571, 
XI.126.  
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ing service to the lord. 78  Izawa Banryū in his 
Bushikun argues more generally against wasting 
one’s life for nothing.79 The most drastic solution 
was that advanced by Ogyū Sorai who argued in his 
sweeping attack against bushido ethics, that what-
ever stupid people may think, samurai should flee 
from petty quarrels to stay useful to their superior.80 
However, the concern for honor was simply too 
deeply entrenched to be swiftly dismissed. The 
same Kōyō gunkan that we have just seen warning 
samurai against petty quarrels admits some pages 
later that it is difficult for a samurai to ignore in-
sults.81 Daidōji Yūzan’s Budō shoshinshū says ex-
actly the same two contradictory things. Samurai 
literature did not offer clear-cut solutions to this 
conflict. 
Hagakure, however, has a different take on this 
matter. We see in the rare stories where its author 
pits honor and loyalty against each other that far 
from being caught in a dilemma without solution, 
protagonists of Hagakure could very well order 
these moral concerns – because their position and 
ability to deliver great loyalty determined their 
choice. Typically highest ranking retainers, or those 
in a position to make valuable contributions, could 
squarely put their loyalty of counsel before any con-
sideration of honor. One anecdote, for example, 
shows a talented samurai dismissing insults in order 
to stay useful and available for his lord.82 Most tell-
ingly the great Sagara Kyūma deliberately disgraced 
himself for the sake of his master so that his im-
pending seppuku could be justified!83 On the other 
hand we constantly see lower ranking samurai 
swiftly responding to the slightest insult, even when 
they are aware that this may create trouble for their 
                                                  
78 Kōyō gunkan, 227. 
79 Bushikun, 155. 
80 Seidan, in Nihon shisō taikei, vol. 26, Ogyū 
Sorai, eds. Yoshikawa Kojirō, alii (Tokyo: Iwanami 
Shoten, 1973) 419 sq. 
81 Kōyō gunkan, 274. 
82 502, IX.21. 
83 221-22, I.7. True, there is one anecdote where 
a samurai in position to offer concrete and important 
service to his lord gives preference to his honor. It is 
the case of Kusunoki Masashige that I mentioned 
earlier (note 46). I will comment on this below (note 
108).  
lord – oie ni go nan.84 It appears thus that in the 
loyalty of counsel, honor is found in good counsel; 
in symbolic service, a very abstract and more often 
than not virtual service is easily subordinated to 
honor and the frenzy.85 
A First Ranking of Preferences. This distinc-
tion between two forms of service, the loyalty of 
counsel and symbolic service, represents a first step 
in ordering Hagakure‘s chaotic stream of aphorisms. 
But we need to go further, for the differentiation of 
social positions is not the final principle ordering 
the different concerns in its moral landscape. It 
alone cannot erase the tension between the antago-
nist virtues and attitudes of the two forms of service. 
The distinction between those able to make a con-
tribution through their talent and wisdom and those 
only able to throw their lives away was probably 
often quite obscure to contemporaries. It was even 
hopelessly blurred when young and lowly retainers 
were hoping to make a lasting contribution in some 
distant future, or when some lower ranking retainer 
hoped to influence policy by gaining the trust of 
high ranking officials.86 In fact Hagakure several 
times ranks the two sets of attitudes independently 
of political position, suggesting thus the existence 
of a superior principle that could more solidly struc-
ture its moral landscape. The problem is that those 
indications are often ambiguous. Some passages 
suggest that the loyalty of counsel is the ideal that 
samurai should aspire to. For example, Hagakure 
frequently affirms that “great loyalty” (daichūsetsu) 
is the counsel offered by careful counselors who 
                                                  
84 469,VIII.34. 
85 The kenka ryōseibai regulations of course 
stemmed from the awareness of the practical 
problems created by constant kenka. I am talking 
here of a possible moral conflict between the two 
forms of service. Ikegami (1995, 291) appears to see 
in the notion of secret love a “logical reconciliation” 
between the norms of honor and of loyalty 
“redefined as secret love”; under such redefinition 
of loyalty a simple act of obedience would become 
an inner virtue of honor. But Hagakure’s mentions 
of honor seem to me to exclude this: there is no 
place for the notion that inner virtue should be the 
source of pride. Na is never mentioned in 
connection with shinobu koi. 
86 For the first case: 313-14, II.141; for the 
second: 258, I.150. 
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remonstrate discreetly with the lord and never stop 
thinking about the good of the domain.87 Its author, 
who never attained such position of counselor 
(karō), even frankly confesses in that this was his 
dream and that it was very difficult for him to ac-
cept that it was never to be.88 In one instance, com-
paring the loyalty of counsel to that of symbolic 
service he even claims that counsel is superior be-
cause the act of throwing his life only lasts a mo-
ment. 89  Such passages, however, are more than 
counterbalanced by others which take the opposite 
position. In these instances the author discounts the 
contributions a retainer offers through his ability 
and wisdom. While still service (hōkō), it definitely 
is not in the same category as the blind gift of life: 
“To make oneself useful through wisdom or skills is 
one step lower.”90 The gift of lowly life is placed 
above the great loyalty of counsel. In another pas-
sage about his modest career as a retainer, the au-
thor claims that although he did not accomplish 
anything, he was nevertheless the best retainer his 
master had ever had! 91 The idea of being at the 
same time without talent and the first retainer is 
offered in an earlier passage and justified likewise 
by the intensity of the emotional attachment and the 
constant virtual possibility of the ultimate sacrifice. 
92 However, this ordering of the two types of ser-
vice which relies on varying personal preferences, is 
still rather weak. I believe that there is another prin-
ciple which unifies much more strongly the two 
services and associated attitudes. 
 
 
                                                  
87 313, II.140; 554-55, XI.28; 571, XI.130. The 
use of the term “great” does not however neces-
sarily mean than this loyalty is greater than the 
virtual and symbolic loyalty of the humble retainers. 
The “loyalty” in the “great loyalty” may also refer 
only to the special loyalty due by counselors and 
would express the ideal form such loyalty would 
take. 
88 313, II.140. 
89 554, XI.28. 
90 220, I.3. 
91 290, II.64. This extraordinary passage is also 
one with strong sexual overtones: the author imag-
ines himself committing junshi on his lord’s futon 
and draped in his night dress!  
92 289, II.62. 
The Idea of the Pure Will, Ichinen.  Con-
sider the following, somewhat enigmatic, passage: 
It is difficult to reject whatever goes against 
moral obligations (fugi) and to uphold these. 
However, should one think that the supreme 
principle consists in upholding moral princi-
ples, mistakes will in fact be many in one’s 
tireless attempt to act accordingly. There is a 
way (michi) superior to moral principles 
(gi).93 
It is not clear what those principles (gi) refer to. 
One may think that they are obligations other than 
loyalty – obligations due to people other than one’s 
master.  Such interpretation may find a measure of 
support in the fact that Hagakure sometimes claims 
that loyalty (michi in the above quote) transcends 
right and wrong (gi). However, in contemporary 
discourse as in the book itself, gi was normally used 
as a substitute for chū.94 Hagakure, besides, always 
refuses, contrary to what such reading would imply, 
to see any tension between loyalty and, say, filial 
piety. 95  My interpretation, following the usual 
meaning of the term in samurai writings, is that gi 
refers in most general terms to moral obligations, 
including loyalty in all its meanings, and that Haga-
kure here voiced the idea that there was a principle 
superior to all the standard moral norms and obliga-
tions. What is this mysterious way? What might 
encompass and order all considerations? A tentative 
answer, to be refined, is that it is simply the frenzy 
do die without cause, without rhyme or reason. This 
is because Hagakure repeatedly places the frenzy 
above moral principles, as in this sentence, previ-
ously quoted: “There is no need for loyalty or for 
filial piety; bushidō is about the frenzy to die.”96 
What could make the frenzy so valuable? The an-
swer may be in the following remark: “It is very 
straightforward (shisainashi)”, says Hagakure, “you 
just need to decide and do it (mune suwatte su-
                                                  
93 233, I.44. 
94 223, I.9, 260, I.163; 262, I.171. There is one 
instance of opposition between taigi (great prin-
ciple) and chūgi, in 260, I.163, but taigi seems to 
refer to the formal obligations of the retainer, and gi 
is still associated to chū. 
95 226, I.19; 262, I.175. 
96 251-52, I.113. 
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sumu).”97 The frenzy rests on an indomitable and 
all-powerful will to death. 
While the will is not a concept or a category 
clearly identified in Hagakure, there is no mistaking 
its importance. Mention of having resolve (kakugo), 
decisiveness (hamaritaru, ketsujō), of marshalling 
intense will (ichinen, isshin), standing up 
(tachiagaru), having strength of mind (tsuyomi), 
displaying energy (ki, or kiryoku), pure intention 
(shōnen), strong disposition (kimochi, kimiai), as 
well as disposition kokoroe,  kokorogake, etc.,  
regularly refer to some aspect of what we call “will” 
or “willpower.”98 The faith that Hagakure puts in 
“will” is striking. A strong will is irresistible and 
capable of absolutely anything.99 As for death, it is 
the most loathsome thing in the world. Because 
people would always choose life over death, it is the 
most unnatural task to perform. 100 The one deci-
sion that puts “will” to the test is the decision to die, 
for here lies the ultimate measure of its strength. It 
is not merely the difficulty and the un-natural char-
acter of the act of death that puts the will to test and 
offers it the opportunity to triumph; it is also that to 
will death is to will “nothing.” Here the author of 
Hagakure seems to have an intuition of the Kantian 
paradox that the will is necessarily the will of some-
thing, but that it cannot become the will of some-
thing without being enslaved by it and losing its 
autonomy as will: to preserve its autonomy the will 
should thus be the will of “nothing”, or of some-
thing as empty as rationality for Kant, the dog’s 
death for the author of Hagakure, or the will itself 
for both.  
What suggests this Kantian moment in Hagakure 
is the contrast between the will to die a dog’s death 
and the ordinary will. Most humans, says its author, 
are kanjōmono, calculating people – originally 
commoners but nowadays pseudo-samurai as well –, 
desperate to acquire worldly goods.101 The gain that 
                                                  
97 220, I.2. 
98 For kakugo, see 241, I.63, 246, I.86; 266, 
I.190; for ketsujō: 246, I.86; hamaritaru: 265, I.189; 
ichinen, isshin: 257, I.143; tachiagaru: 574, 
XI.141 ; tsuyomi: 245, I.85 ; ki: 436, VII.1 ; kiryoku: 
279, II.23 ; shōnen: 240, I.61 ; kimochi: 462, 
VIII.31 ; kimiai: 472, VIII.42. 
99257, I.143. 
100220, I.2. 
101230, I.35. 
they seek entraps and determines their will (tsune ni 
sontoku no kokoro taezaru nari).102 Their will im-
mediately loses its freedom. It becomes literally the 
will of the worldly goods. The will behind the 
frenzy to die, on the contrary, is not determined by 
anything else. It is neither demanded (as we shall 
see) by some hard fact or norms of nature or the 
cosmos, nor is it bound by some tangible good it 
seeks to acquire. It is the will of nothing, or of noth-
ingness. It is free. Whether we accept or not that 
that the author of Hagakure had an intuition of this 
paradox of the will, it is impossible not to be struck 
by the fascination or obsession that Hagakure dis-
plays toward the will, by the stress put on intensity 
of the will at the moment of its maximum ten-
sion.103 Here is what we have been looking for: 
As a human being, what is the important 
thing to strive for and execute? – To have a 
pure will now (tadaima shōnen shiteiru 
yōni).104 
There is indeed no concern for loyalty, honor or 
filial duty here. The idea that what matters is only 
the sheer intensity of the will in action is repeated in 
many passages, and suggests that the will is a prin-
ciple even higher than symbolic service and 
frenzy.105 Life is lived “one will at a time” (ichinen 
ichinen), and there is nothing apart from this instan-
taneous will here and now (tanteki tadaima no ichi-
                                                  
102251, I.111. 
103 If the frenzy to die appears as a tremendous 
feat of the will, this effort must be sustained, and 
requires arduous discipline. Because the will may be 
tempted by goods, it must be steeled through the 
constant contemplation of the anti-good, death. 
Building on Buddhist meditation (some versions of 
which were called hakkotsu kan, “contemplation of 
white bones”, a practice strikingly similar to the 
“vanities” of XVIIth century Europe) and on the dif-
ferent stages (the kuso) of death and decay, but giv-
ing it a military twist, Hagakure enjoins us to medi-
tate on the spectacle of our bodies burnt, cut open, 
speared, or crushed (572, XI-133). But the purpose 
of such meditation here is not purely Buddhist. It is 
an exercise (probably useless) of the will that should 
insure that through the representation of oneself as 
already dead the will stays free and unbound. 
104240, I.61. 
10527, II.17; 284, II.48; XI.141. 
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nen).106 The ultimate criterion of approval and the 
unifying thread in Hagakure is thus neither loyalty, 
nor any other moral norm, and not even bushidō per 
se, but the intensity of purpose. Pure will does not 
displace honor or loyalty, which are largely deter-
mined by non-moral considerations associated with 
hierarchical positions, but it is clearly the transcend-
ing principle. It permits choice in the innumerable 
grey zones of life and goes beyond the samurai 
group and its ethos – “as a human being”, said the 
quote above. 107 Whatever attitude is adopted by 
whoever, it will be approved if it is supported by 
this invincible pure will of the moment. This is why 
the author of Hagakure can openly admire behavior 
totally opposed to all the moral considerations he 
elsewhere accepts or professes.108 This is why there 
exists for him no moral dilemma: when one is 
caught between conflicting obligations, what mat-
ters is not the choice of one or the other – filial piety 
or loyalty – but the choice itself which must be done 
with an intensity than can only be proved in accep-
tance of death. As an earlier quote (cf. II.3) made it 
clear, whoever has a pure will is the kusemono– the 
                                                  
106 278, II.17 
107 “In serious affairs in which you are con-
cerned, the only way to settle things is to rely on 
one’s own judgment, and to go along without hesi-
tation. In matters of importance, if conferring with 
other people, it will often be the case that they will 
not pay attention, or that they will not speak the 
truth. This is when you use your own judgment. At 
any rate, go to the end of your frenzy and throw 
your life away.” (267, I.193.) Hagakure many times 
stresses the importance of asking for advice and 
listening to other’s opinions – this is probably a 
component of the loyalty of counsel, but in the 
frenzy individuals rely solely on their own choice, 
decision and will. 
108 Cf. in 120, VIII.56 the case of a man who 
robs and plunders his domain, examples of lies and 
dissimulation excused for the strong purpose they 
served in 541, X.124; 555, XI.32, or the case of 
Kusunoki Masashige who refrains from helping his 
master out of dislike for treachery. Of course, there 
cannot be any reason for the will itself. Here we 
reach the a-philosophical, the ungrounded aesthetic 
dimension that runs through Hagakure that explains 
its numerous remarks on the importance of beautiful 
form – a subject I cannot fully treat here. 
elusive hero who lurks in so many passages of Ha-
gakure. 
 
Hagakure’s Sociological Interest: Death as 
Cultural Capital.  
 
Having thus tried to provide a more unified 
interpretation of the moral message of Hagakure, I 
would now like to offer an assessment from two 
other perspectives, those of the sociology of ideas – 
where the answer to the question “why does it say 
what it says?” is extracted from the social 
circumstances of the message and views it as a 
symptom of these circumstances– and of philosophy 
– where the philosophical value of the work is 
questioned. 
The sociological perspective should comple-
ment what has been said above, for it helps to ex-
plain the frantic dimension of the will to die, a di-
mension which can only be understood through a 
consideration of the social circumstances experi-
enced by the author. One of the most striking fea-
tures of those circumstances appears when we re-
visit the act the most intense variant of which is the 
frenzy – voluntary death – and question its social 
meanings. Death of course was a common concern 
of most of the books and treatises in the samurai 
discourse. 109 But in the narratives of Hagakure we 
find a distinctive accent on the act of death, and find 
most of its different meanings richly illustrated.110 
                                                  
109 Among the most important representatives of 
the genre, Budō shoshin shū (DaidōjiYūzan, Budō 
shoshin shū, in Kinsei buke kyōiku shisō vol. 3 (To-
kyo: Nihon toshosentâ, 1979), although of a very 
different tone from Hagakure, also starts with the 
topic of death, enjoining samurai to never forget for 
one moment, all year long, that they are about to die. 
Its author, Daidōji Yūzan (1639-1730), was also 
born well after Pax Tokugawa began. Cf. also Mi-
kagawa monogatari, in Mikawa monogatari, Haga-
kure; the earlier (compiled early seventeenth cen-
tury) Kōyō gunkan (p. 227); Yamaga Sokō’s Ya-
maga gorui, in Yamaga Sokō zenshū, vol 7 (Tokyo: 
Iwanami Shoten, 1940), 35-36. But these works 
were mainly treating death as an event, a conse-
quences, to be accepted, of other actions. 
110 Contemporary vocabulary sometimes classi-
fied various types of voluntary death (jishi, jigai, 
jiketsu, jijin, jisai) according to their objective: sui-
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We see instances of samurai having to take respon-
sibility for some trivial misconduct and ordered to 
commit seppuku.111  We see others die taking re-
sponsibility for a serious misdeed.112 We see retain-
ers performing death to return a favor, or to express 
the exclusive relationship with the lord upon his 
death.113 We see some bushi affirming their readi-
ness to disembowel themselves when about to give 
advice or to remonstrate, to threaten or to black-
mail. 114  We see warriors committing suicide be-
cause they were caught between conflicting obliga-
tions, a common occurrence in a cultural context 
where obligations were prescriptions of behavior 
toward specific individuals. 115  We see samurai 
throwing their lives away in hopeless fights to take 
revenge, to defend their name, to restore their honor, 
or to engage in forced honorific rivalry.116 We even 
see suicide as a way of fulfilling “silent” or not so 
silent love in a homosexual relationship.  And of 
course we see death ostensibly chosen under the 
name or the pretext of loyalty to one’s lord: “the 
first thing for a warrior is to give his life to his 
lord.”117 
Beyond the diversity of their purposes, all 
those forms of death were highly symbolic acts, 
existing in a social class for which its relationship to 
                                                                             
cides for the purpose of remonstrance or kanshi, 
suicides to express spite or fury munenbara, soko-
tsushi (not represented in Hagakure), suicide out of 
loyalty after one’s master’s natural death, junshi, 
called in the Hagakure oibara. A good overview of 
the history and forms of seppuku is in Yamamoto 
Hirofumi, Seppuku: Nihonjin no sekinin no torikata 
(Kōbunsha, Kōbunshashinsho, 2003). 
111 256, I.136. 
112 268, I.198. 
113 527, X.67; 251, I.112. 
114  For seppuku as remonstrance, see 244, I.76; 
for blackmail, XI.65; XI.91. 
115 505, IX.30. Arai Hakuseki states in his auto-
biography that only people culturally equipped with 
the suicide ethos could deal with such conflict when 
he comments on the case of commoner woman who 
had been caught in such situation (Arai Hakuseki, 
Oritakushiba no ki (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1999), 
200). 
116 475, VIII.45; 476, VIII.47; 485, VIII.62; 508, 
IX.39. 
117 230, I.35; 274, II.7. 
death helped to identify and justify its existence. 
Yamaga Sokō expressed the urgency of the justifi-
cation problem when he asked what could explain 
the fact that bushi, while unproductive, were at the 
top of the social order.118 His answer – that they 
were providing the model of correct behavior – 
would have failed to impress. That only few samu-
rai could be moral models would have been very 
clear. The needs of governance could not have ex-
plained either the large number of samurai or the 
incompetence of most. More than moral or adminis-
trative qualifications, it was some vague aura of 
authority that made warrior rule look like a part of 
the natural, normal state of things. Samurai author-
ity came from many sources, but among them was 
certainly the constant affirmation we find in the 
bushidō literature of the readiness to die. 119 The 
readiness (happily, for most samurai, a purely rhe-
torical readiness), or even the eagerness, to part with 
one’s life was what set the warrior class apart from 
the rest of the population. It was the always possible 
feat of self-inflicted death that could justify the spe-
cial position of the bushi. It was a case of noblesse 
oblige, not in the sense that nobility would create 
obligations, but rather in the sense that obligations 
invested nobility on their bearers. It is in this sense 
that voluntary death was not merely a status symbol, 
but the core item of the bushi group’s cultural capi-
tal. In this sense the obsession of Hagakure with 
death makes it an eloquent testimony to the author-
ity of this capital.  
However, Hagakure does not merely tell us, 
with much pathos, how important voluntary death 
was in the cultural capital of the samurai; this alone 
would not explain the frenzy. This would only ex-
plain the stoic attitude of the samurai who accepted 
that noblesse oblige. Hagakure also tells us that 
death had to be frantically pursued. Why that is be-
comes clear when we recognize that, for the author 
of the book, the samurai whose status rested on the 
act of death were, as true samurai, already dead: He 
repeatedly states that the bushi had lost their soul, 
                                                  
118 In the introduction to his Bukyō shōgaku, in 
Nihon rinri ihen, vol 4, ed. Inoue Tetsujirō (Tokyo: 
Ikusei kai, 1902 ) 677. 
119  On the notion of authority to explain 
obedience and conformity in Tokugawa society, see 
my “Rituals as Utopia”, Japanese Studies 29, No 1 
(2009) 33-45. 
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their ethos, their raison d’être, their identity. Tamed 
into bureaucrats, they had been infected with the 
calculating lowly way of the commoners.120 Where-
as their ancestors carefully avoided all contact with 
chōnin, contemporary “samurai” freely mixed with 
them, and unsurprisingly acquired their obsession 
with wealth, goods, or pleasures, their ways of 
thinking, evaluating and calculating.121 In fact, Ha-
gakure insists on several occasions they had even 
been physically transformed into commoners – or, 
more exactly, and worse, into women, having ac-
quired a feminine pulse!122 The despair and the 
urgency characteristic of the frenzy to die can then 
be understood as the despair and urgency of an 
“identitary quest”, of an attempt to salvage the iden-
tity of a class that was only a ghost of its former self, 
through the flaunting of the core item of its cultural 
capital. (Granted, the bushi class would in fact sur-
vive for another 150 years, but, the author of Haga-
kure would have said, only in name, as a collection 
of tamed bureaucrats, powerless, nostalgic and bit-
ter.) 
 
The Philosophical Interest 
 
The Problem of Death and the Absence of 
Meaning. The philosophical interest of Hagakure 
may be much less obvious. After all, there is no de-
nying that the work is haunted by a streak of insan-
ity – in the sense of logical meaninglessness –, a 
streak most likely linked to the haunting presence of 
death.123 The problem is not that Hagakure reminds 
us of our mortal condition. This would not insure 
meaninglessness.124 For its author, death does not 
                                                  
120 230, I.35; 241, I.63; 251, I.111. 
121 223, I.11. 
122 238, I.36; 300, II.110. 
123 Many have commented on this – helped by 
the inviting remarks of the book on madness and 
frenzy. In his article “Death, Honor, and Loyalty: 
The Bushido Ideal”, Cameron Hurst character-
istically described its author as “a zealot” and a 
“weekend warrior”. 
124 True, according to a common folk philoso-
phy – the most eloquent expression of which is 
probably found in the works of E. Cioran (1911-
1995; see his Anathema and Admirations, or The 
trouble with being born, among others) –, since the 
meaning of an action can only be found in the rela-
mark the limit (within which, in fact, meaning is 
possible), but is the necessary means to an end – the 
retrieving of samurai identity. This is why, drawing 
on Buddhist themes, he constantly introduces death 
into a worldly perspective, and why he can pretend 
that “only the end of things is important.”125 The 
problem is that this means prevents the realization 
of its ends. One cannot help wonder what point 
there is in regaining identity only to fall into obliv-
ion. Another, closely related, reason for the feeling 
of the meaninglessness that runs through Hagakure 
is obsessive pursuit of something which, by concep-
tual necessity, cannot be achieved: the identity of 
someone else. Making the point that things and be-
ings are only what they are, and cannot be some-
thing else without ceasing to be, Leibniz told some-
one who had expressed the wish to be the Emperor 
of China that this was akin to wishing to be dead: 
indeed there is some conceptual instability in any 
desire to change identity since it negates the agent 
indispensable to achieving this very wish. Hagakure 
is guilty of such sin because, while it fully recog-
nized that changing social and political circum-
stances made the persona of the old samurai totally 
impossible and foreign, it nonetheless kept urging 
the new sanitized, feminine retainers to be that 
                                                                             
tion between this action and the ends it achieves, the 
rules it obeys, or the states of mind it expresses, the 
fact of death – real death, that is, the definitive ter-
mination of all bodily and spiritual existence which 
seems to have been Hagakure’s understanding – by 
spelling the disappearance of ends, rules and states 
of mind, also spells the impossibility of meaning. 
This folk philosophy, however, is wrong. The fact 
that people, in spite of what it tells them, go about 
their life as if there was no such thing as death 
awaiting for them suggests well enough that the out-
of-life perspective needed to see death as destroying 
our ends, rules or states of mind is not sustainable. 
It is a view from nowhere that cannot have any im-
pact on life. On this point see Strawson’s remarks 
on a similar perspective: Peter F. Strawson, “Free-
dom and resentment”, in Proceedings of the British 
Academy, 48 (1962). On the absence of any impact 
of such external perspective on people’s lives, see 
Nietzsche (Gay Science, § 278) and Vauvenargues 
(Reflections and Maxims, § 140, 142, 143). 
125 281, II.30; 283, II.39. 
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someone else. 126 Its author seems to have hoped to 
achieve an end (the identity of other people) which 
destroys its agent through a means (death) which 
destroys everything.  
 
Metaphysical Pluralism. This flirtation with 
meaninglessness does not mean that there are no 
philosophically interesting perspectives in Haga-
kure. Such perspectives are suggested by many re-
marks about the very fragile nature of the bushi 
ethos and on the identity the auhor was trying to 
retrieve. He affirms that the cultural capital that so 
urgently needed to be reasserted was also, from a 
detached perspective, perfectly illusory. The author 
of Hagakure was acutely aware that voluntary death 
and the whole bushidō ethos articulated around it 
were simply what we would call a social imaginary: 
a corpus of representations and values organizing 
interactions and guiding interpretations, judgments 
and actions in a certain group of human beings, but 
a corpus of representations without any absolute 
ground or justification, without reality, concreteness 
or truth, that just happened to be there as the prod-
uct of circumstances and opportunities. Whenever 
they present themselves as absolutely valid, the dis-
courses of the social imaginary are wrong; but what 
matters is that they are there as a way or a form of 
life. Indeed, for those whose existence they define, 
these forms are as demanding as any real fact. What 
leads me to this conclusion are passages like this 
one: 
Listening to Buddhist teachings would be an 
extraordinary error for a young samurai. This 
is because things would appear in two per-
spectives. But nothing will ever be achieved 
if you don’t go in one direction only.127 
                                                  
126 Hagakure recognizes that however regretta-
ble was the loss of the old world of bushidō, how-
ever lamentable was the transformation of loyal 
retainers into self interested effeminate chōnin, such 
movement was not reversible (278, II.18). Strangely 
enough, considering that it seems to be attempting 
just this, it even goes on denouncing people who 
spend their time lamenting the demise of this world 
as deeply mistaken (ibid.). 
127 398, VI-21; a similar idea is expressed in 
288, II.61; 465, VIII.22. While Hagakure would 
have been a very different work had not its author 
What could this mean? Hagakure here places on 
the same level the perspective of Buddhism which 
denounces all worldly values as empty, and that of 
bushidō which affirms certain worldly values, and 
demands that one die for them. It does not imply 
that one outlook is right or valid, and the other false 
and invalid. It suggests rather that whoever learns to 
see things in the Buddhist way will not be able to 
see them in the way needed by Hagakure’s brand of 
bushidō. Each of these perspectives is valid, but 
incompatible with the other. A choice has to be 
made, but this choice is not the choice of the one 
and only right answer: here we see how the will is 
linked to this metaphysical thesis. This pluralism, 
not noticed in the literature surrounding Hagakure, 
is confirmed by countless other passages. Firstly, 
this idea that there are concurrent perspectives on 
the world, that “things appear under two aspects” 
(mono ga futatsu ni naru) – something samurai 
must avoid at all cost –, appears in several pas-
sages.128 The book starts also by claiming that even 
if Confucius or Buddha were to appear in Na-
beshima family’s domain, they would not accept 
and adopt the local habits – that is the local brand of 
samurai ethos.129 There is here no affirmation of 
universal validity for the local brand of ethics. Ha-
gakure only says that a samurai follows Nabeshima 
values simply because he was born there, while 
Confucius and Buddha were not. Elsewhere, going 
against both the common syncretism (all ways are 
the same) and dogmatism (only one way is valid), 
the work claims that there are different ways (michi) 
and that one should simply stick to one, and avoid 
mixing heterogeneous elements of different ways.130 
                                                                             
taken the Buddhist orders upon retirement, the role 
of Buddhism is often only cursorily acknowledged 
(Ikegami, p.287). The putative author of Hagakure, 
Yamamoto Tsunetomo, does not seem to have been 
a exclusive follower of one Buddhist sect: Zen, 
Amidist schools and even Nichiren appear in nu-
merous references to Buddhism. The idea of ichinen, 
the pure instantaneous will has Zen overtones, but is 
found also in teaching about the invocations of 
Amida’s name. 
128 257, 1.139; 268, I.195, and passages quoted 
in the above note. 
129 216, Introduction. 
130 257, I.139. This is why I do not subscribe to 
Ikegami’s analysis of the “han nationalism” of 
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Even more significantly, a bushi is said to follow his 
master even if this should lead him to fall into hell 
or be a victim of divine retribution.131 Similarly the 
way of the samurai is said to be pursued even when 
it comes into conflict with the desires of the gods of 
Shinto. 132  In such passages Shinto or Buddhist 
teachings are never dismissed as false. Gods and 
Buddhas are not claimed to be illusions. They are 
assumed to be real – just like hell is –, and the au-
thor of Hagakure even claims to respect them, but 
while real they are not relevant for bushi: they rep-
resent other systems of values, just as valid or even 
truer than bushidō, but not relevant for people who 
happened to be samurai. Lastly, confirming this 
reading, Hagakure never made any attempt to 
ground its brand of bushido in some natural order of 
things, in metaphysics, like Yamaga Sokō for exam-
ple. In fact its rare comments on the natural world 
point to a very secular, totally “disenchanted” view 
of the world, where the natural objects and phenom-
ena are unable to support the universality of moral 
values. “Prosperity and decay belong to fate (ten-
nen). The good and the bad belong to the way of 
humans. It is for the purpose of moral preachings 
that we talk about prosperity and decay.”133 By the 
same token natural phenomena are merely the prod-
ucts of mechanisms unrelated to human affairs: 
“Whenever events out of the ordinary happen, to 
talk of mysteries or of warnings of things to come is 
a stupid thing to do.”134 If all these indications con-
                                                                             
Hagakure (Ikegani 1995, 295-97). Ikegami believes 
that the rejection of other doctrines only expresses 
“han nationalism”. More interesting is the fact that 
the author of Hagakure does not dismiss the 
intrinsic validity of these other doctrines. The idea 
that many forms of life can be equally valid and 
equally without solid foundations in nature is not 
only philosophically more interesting than “han 
nationalism” but it makes more sense of the 
passages where the author puts side by side not only 
Nabeshima han and other han, but also and more 
frequently bushidō and Buddhism, Shinto or 
Confucianism, etc., without decrying the validity of 
any of those ethical messages. 
131 290-01, II.65. 
132 294, II.82. 
133 248, I.95. 
134 249, I.104. This refusal to rely on some uni-
versal justification, and this preference for local 
firm that a streak of pluralism runs deep in Haga-
kure’s outlook, an even more radical devaluation of 
all worldly values appears when the book takes a 
more decisively Buddhist perspective, and advances 
the idea that beings and phenomena in this world 
are without substance, that we are all puppets sur-
rounded by illusions: sekai ha mina karakurinin-
gyōnari.135 More generally, life is said in many in-
stances to be only a meaningless dream.136 
One should note that such metaphysics – what in 
modern philosophical jargon is called “fictionalism”, 
the theory that states that certain normative or de-
scriptive propositions about the world can be both 
untrue and valid – is not unique to Hagakure. While 
uncommon, this metaphysical configuration is 
found scattered through Japanese thought. The 
Buddhist preacher Shinran claimed that he would 
follow the teachings of his master even if they were 
proven to be false and cause his fall into hell.137 
The Confucian thinker Yamazaki Ansai said that he 
believed in the correctness of Zhu Xi’s doctrine, 
even it is was wrong.138 Ogyū Sorai stressed that 
Shinto had to be followed even if its gods were 
                                                                             
ethics and the concurrent acceptance of its circum-
stantial and limited value, seem to me to have been 
common in the samurai class: the great critics of 
naturalist and universal justification, Ogyū Sorai 
and Kaiho Seiryō, were of samurai origin. The insis-
tence of samurai houses on their own code of ethics, 
their propensity to stress its differences with other 
warrior houses may have facilitated this perception 
of norms as locally – and thus weakly – grounded. 
More generally of course the presence in Japan of 
distinct traditions, from Buddhism and Confucian-
ism to Shinto, could have encouraged the idea of 
competing but equally legitimate accounts, although, 
more often than not, syncretism or dogmatism was 
the answer. The fact that the putative author of Ha-
gakure, Yamamoto Tsunetomo, himself had made 
the transition from a samurai retainer to Buddhist 
recluse is relevant too.  
135 231, I-42; 284, II.44. 
136 295, II-85; 574, XI.142. 
137 Shinran, Tan’ishō, in Shinranshū, ed. Masu-
tani Fumio (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, Nihon no 
shisō 3, 1968) 352. 
138 Takashima Motohiro, Yamazaki Ansai (To-
kyo: Perikansha,  1992) 8. 
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lies.139 Conversely, he added that things proven to 
be real should be dismissed if there was no place for 
them in the teachings of the sages.140 Shinran, An-
sai and Sorai thus all advanced a fictionalist posi-
tion. While it is tempting to dismiss this a mere 
rhetoric I believe that in Hagakure the context of 
these utterances show clearly that they were not 
simply rhetorical and that its author had an intuition 
of a fictionalist theory.141 
The Triumph of the Will and the Existential-
ist Solution to Pluralism. This idea of modes of 
existence valid yet deprived of absolute grounding 
in reality allows us to complete the account of the 
will by fully displaying its extraordinary power. 
Hagakure repeatedly stresses that the power of the 
free will is invincible (Ichinen okoru to tenchi wo 
mo omohiogasu mono nari142), but it is in the fol-
lowing passage, already partially, quoted, that the 
full extent of its power appears:  
The hero (kusemono) gives no thought to vic-
tory or defeat. Without a moment’s  hesita-
tion he is possessed by the frenzy to die. This 
is when you understand. This is when you 
wake up from the dream. (Kore nite yume 
samuru nari)143 
Here the sheer tension of an undetermined and 
pure will has accomplished a miracle. Dying for 
                                                  
139  Ogyū Sorai, Taiheisaku, in Nihon shisō 
taikei, vol. 26, Ogyū Sorai, eds. Yoshikawa Kojirō, 
alii (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1973) 452. 
140 Ogyū Sorai, Tōmonjo, in Ogyū Sorai zenshū, 
vol 6. eds. Imanaka Kanji, alii  (Tokyo: Kawade 
Shobō Shinsha, 1973) 192.   
141  Just like, for example, the context of 
Dostoyevsky’s similar statements about following 
Jesus even if Jesus was wrong (in Selected letters of 
Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Joseph Frank and D. Goldstein 
eds. (New Brunswick and London: Rutgers Univer-
sity Press, 1987) p. 68; repeated in The possessed 
(London: Heineman 1946) p. 225. shows that they 
should be treated seriously. In Japan the long de-
bates between Confucian and Nativist scholars 
about the sense in which the descriptions of the Age 
of Gods in the ancient scriptures could be valid, 
albeit, in another sense, quite false would also have 
facilitated this proto fictionalism. 
142257, I.143. 
143237, I-55. 
nothing, the hero has shown through this extraordi-
nary feat of will that he is, unlike most of his fellow 
humans, no puppet trapped in an illusory world. He 
has overcome the realm of illusions. When it is in-
tense and pure will alone can create value and 
autonomy, claims the author of Hagakure who 
seems fortuitously to prefigure the sort of existen-
tialism we can read in Nietzsche and Kierkegaard 
where it is the mere fact of the will in its full inten-
sity – not its object – which insures freedom. 144 
The pure will of so different figures as the thief 
Horie San’emon, the just and noble warrior Ku-
sunoki Masashige, the loyal retainer Sagara Kyūma 
willing to shame his name, and the innumerable low 
ranking samurai dying in kenka, or for their master 
or for their faults, lifts – if only for an instant – their 
being out of shadowy illusion and into existence.  
Such a proto existentialist theme of the pure 
will is what organizes in the most coherent possible 
way the dislocated message of Hagakure, responds 
to the social circumstances of the work, and finally 
explains its enduring appeal.
                                                  
144 In the same spirit probably, in an explicit 
discussion of identity, Hagakure remarks of the Ni-
chiren sect of Buddhism that it is simply by being 
obstinate, by refusing compromise that it succeeded 
in existing (235, I.49). 
